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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES AND OTRO MATERIAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Manley 0.
William Reynolds Vance,
Hudson, American Case Book Service.
General Editor; West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1929, pp. 1538, xxxv.
A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHE READINGS ON THE LAw or NATIONS CHIEFLY AS IT IS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED ay BRITISH AND AmmMOAN COUnTS. By Edwin DeWitt Dickinson. McGraw-Hill Co., New

York, 1920, pp. 1133, xxxvii.
Books on International Law are greatly changed in their content
and approach since the Great War and the establishment of the League
of Nations. The emphasis placed upon the laws of war in the earlier
books has been materially altered in that a chapter or two may be devoted to neutrality and war as compared with half or more of the book
in the case of earlier volumes.
Mr. Manley 0. Hudson has completed a case book on International
Law with but two chapters devoted to Hostile Relations of States and
Neutrality. The larger portion is given over to States, Nationality,
Territory, Jurisdiction, Succession, Diplomatic Intercourse, etc., etc.
The cases selected consist of some of the classical group with valuable
additions of more recent date. Interspersed through the chapters along
with the cases are reprinted treaties whose contents bear on the subject of the chapter. The book is equipped with lists of cases and
treaties, the text of decisions, treaty material and an index, all of
which make the volume a sound working text for advanced students.
The book of Professor Dickinson is not so much a text and case
-book on International Law as it is a collection of cases, comments of
publicists, and treaties. To put it in the words of the preface:
"The volume includes much public international law, a good deal
of private international law, some constitutional law, and a substantial
selection from the municipal law which is applied by courts in various
cases affecting international relations. As the subtitle is intended to
suggest, the book aims to present the Law of Nations 'Chiefly as it is
Interpreted and Applied by British and American Courts."'
As in the case of Professor Hudson's book but little space is devoted to war and its international problems. Most of the Dickinson
volume is given over to the quotations from the writings of publicists
and the text of treaties with illustrating cases.
These boks are representative of the new movement in the study
of international affairs that should be encouraged. Too much space
has been given over to war and admiralty cases in the books of an
earlier period, and too little to the problems of states as "'going concerns." It is just as much an error to go the other way. As usable
books In college courses the books under review are too bulky in con-
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tent and not sufficiently editorialized in the way of notes and comments.
FRaxs L. MoVEY
University of Kentucky.
FRoM THE PHYSIOAL TO THE SOoIAL SC
sUcOs.By Jacques Reuff.
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1919. pp. xxxii, 159.
The opinion is widely held today that the social sciences are seriously tandicapped by a lack of scientific method. In our recent reading we have come across two statements that should' serve as a challenge to the scholars in these fields. President Scott, of Northwestern,
has said, "All our human relations will improve as we make progress
in the Social Sciences, and our Universities can make as great contributions here as they made in the 19th century in the physical
sciences." Ogden and Goldenweiser state that, "Civilization nurtured
and strengthened by the natural and exact sciences looks for its
preservation and enhancement to the sciences of society." The problem
of improving the technique of the social sciences is the central theme
of this book. Mr. Reuff would transfer the techniques of the physical
sciences to the social science field.
Mr. Reuff devotes considerable time to a contrast between the
effectiveness of the techniques in the physical and the social sciences,
and there is'no doubt that the latter come out second best. We further
believe that no one would dispute the author's thesis that the methods
of the physicial sciences are more "exact, objective, and fruitful" than
those of the social sciences. But in our opinion the weakness of the
book lies in the failure of the author to show how the transfer can oe
made. With the exception of a highly technical exposition of mathematical theory as applied to political economy, no real effort is made
to show the practical applicability of physical science technique to the
social sciences. The author omits entirely any discussion of the "social
science" of law. That is supplied in an introduction by Herman
Oliphant and Abram Hewitt.
As we see it, Mr. Reuff is in about the same position as the
doctrinaire socialist who makes the comparison between the two systems, capitalist and socialist, and then rests. To the realist, the significant queries are: how can the transition be made, and if made, do we
have any right to expect that the application of the technique in the
new field will be fruitful of results?
It should be the essence of the author's case to show a sufficient
similarity between the very nature of the physical and the social
sciences to at least justify prima facie the experimental transfer. Mr.
Reuff is strangely silent concerning the obvious differences in the
very nature of most physical science as contrasted with social science
problems. We hear little about the inherent complexity of many social
science problems; the difficulty of Isolating a social problem; the many
Imponderable factors involved therein; the difficulty of acquiring correct reports on basic phenomena involved, for in many social problems
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it w6uld be impossible to make an original investigation of all the
phenomena directly or indirectly pertinent. On the other hand he has
no time to contrast with this the fact that many problems in the
physical sciences are comparatively simple; that the problem can be
isolated; that the factors can be artificially controlled under laboratory conditions; that the pertinent phenomena involved are by their
very nature subject in many cases to exact mathematical measurement.
The author overlooks the necessity of this analysis and comparison
and attempts to reach the same result in the development of his thesis
by means of a short cut. He says, "We in no wise attempt to modify
the social sciences in order to bend them to the scientific form. We
affirm, on the contrary, that just as they are now, they present all the
characteristics of the so-called physical sciences. Nor would this
astonish us since, as Descarte said, intelligence is one, as is the sun
for the worlds it illuminates" (p. 65). If this is not sufficiently convincing to quash all doubts, then consider the second argument introduced by the author, to-wit: that in both the physical and the social
sciences, man can only scientifically think by recognizing and utilizing
two great laws-the Law of Identity and the Law of Casuality." Since
man first began the systematic study of the universe, he has been unable to think outside of these laws" (p. 5). Well, what of it? Graiat
the conclusion, and we are still on the threshold of our problem. We
have not even started to move toward a solution of the problem as to
whether the techniques of the physical sciences can be applied
effectively to theF social sciences. And the two legal scholars who write
the introduction insist that "as we read him, we are not moving in the
realm of metaphysics and metaphysical implications should be rigidly
excluded." (xxxi.)
We predict that this book will appeal to those faddists who are
interested solely in the problems of the approach and of technique.
Unfortunately modern scholarship has developed an extreme type of
thinker aptly characterized as the "frontiersman" who, in his devotion
to the study of technique (cleverly or otherwise) evades the consideration of real problems. He never attempts to master the content
of his own field because his energy is being utilized in a study of the
approach. He flits about on that borderland between the social sciences.
At one moment he is a devotee of the "psychological approach to political science," at the next he perhaps is "sold" on "the political approach to psychology." We desire at this point to present a few typical
illustrations that will reveal this modern "frontiersman" in his true
light.
(1) We have come in contact with applicants for the doctorate
in economics who have admitted that they never read Smith or Ricardo
or Mill. Their only knowledge of the "classical school" was derived
indirectly from some professor's criticism of it. They knew the
methods and the approaches by which it would be torn to pieces (to
their satisfaction). The probability is that they were not attacking
the "classical doctrine" but were knocking down a straw man. (2)
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In our younger days we have wasted time arguing with pluralists who
never read Austin. The pluralist revolt can only be characterized as
a tempest in a tea pot. It is a typical illustration of scholarship gone
amuck. These frontiersmen attack the bogey of a "sovereignty." They
might have utilized their energy to better advantage. They have
never coined another term that is more accurate. They have misconstrued Austin and have, in their own minds, convicted him of gross
stupidity. Austin was not ignorant of the long struggle between church
and state, and further, he left an outlet in his theory for the idea and
the fact of revolution. (3) We have been in a discussion group when
the problem for consideration was the report made by ten prominent
jurists headed by Dean Pound of the exploits of the A. Mitchell Palmer
regime in dealing with post-war radicalism. Instead of dealing with
the problem on the merits, the typical "frontiersman" would neither
endorse nor condemn the program of the Department of Justice, but
would attempt to drag a "red herring" across the trail by introducing
into the discussion a consideration of the theoretical advantages and
'disadvantages of the "static" and "dynamic" approach to constitutional
law. Although he would carefully avoid any defense of the Government's position, he would not overlook the opportunity to take a fling
at the "James M. Beck interpretation of the Constitution" and would
intimate that perhaps there was "rubber" in the Bill of Rights (not
realizing that rubber might have a tensile strength limit that was
exceeded in the case under discussion). (4) Further, we have seen
the faddists in their enthusiasm for something new, distort a really
valuable contribution in methodology into a caricature of its former
self. Witness the reception of the Pound "Sociological Approach to
Jurisprudence" as interpreted by many sociologists and other dilettants
in the social sciences. The same thing could be said for the Leon Green
analysis of tort cases outlined in -his "Rationale of Proximate Cause."
Dean Green anticipated this very thing, and warned that "the method
of analysis dveloped in the foregoing pages does not purport to make
the deciding of cases autonatic or even easy" (p. 199). But even if
this warning had been printed in bold faced type on every page, it
would not have prevented the faddist from having his thrill out of a
new technique.
The point will perhaps be raised, why lay the shortcomings of the
frontiersman at Mr. Reuff's door? The answer is that Mr. Reuff has
written the sort of book that will actually encourage that type of
thinking. He has become the frontiersman par excellence. The salient
point of his thesis, to-wit: that the techniques of the physical sciences
MUST apply in the social science field, rests on the flimsy foundation
"that man cannot think outside of the two great laws of Indentity and
Causality." In his eagerness to show the inevitability of his thesis,
Mr. Reuff has evaded the consideration of the important practical
problem-will the technique of the physical sciences work effectively in
the social science field? If you admit the author's assumption that
man can only think scientifically when utilizing the two laws of Ident-
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ity and Causality, it may be that the only valid conclusion that can
be reached is that much of our thinking in the social sciences today is
non-scientific. Considering the manner by which this conclusion has
been developed, the contribution becomes so trivial that it scarcely
justifies the writing of the book. The author might have performed a
more valuable service by presenting a careful analysis of current
methods of non-scientific thought in the social sciences and by virtue
of a wealth of illustrations of types of thinking to be avoided, have
issued a challenge and a warning to the workers in this field.
Let it be understood that we do not deprecate the study of methods
and technique as such. Dean Pound in the, law, and Professors Merriam
and Hall and others in the field of Political Science have attacked
the same problem that confronts Mr. Reuff and have dealt with it In
a much more intelligent and effective manner. The author of this
book apparently has never read the reports on "the Conference on the
Science of Politics" appearing in the American Political Science Review for February, 1924, and February, 1926, and in the 1921 Merriam
article on "The Present State of the Study of Politics."
This review is already much too long, and we realize that there
will be many who will heartily endorse the sentiment of the author's
Introduction to the book when they declare, "There is no science
of law. But how there may be, is made abundantly clear by Mr. Reuff's
little book." (p. xxviii.) To the members of this school of thought,
the book will be characterized as "very suggestive."
FORREST REVERE BLAcx
LEcTURES ox LEaAL Topics. Vol. VII, 1925-26. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1929, pp. vii, 359.
The series of lectures of which the present volume Is a part, have
been delivered before the Association of the Bar in the City of New
York during the past ten years. Volume VII contains the lectures
given during the court year 1925-26. The whole series includes addresses by more than one hundred members of the bar, men who are
recognized as leaders in their special fields. Outside of volume I,
which contains only lectures dealing with legal phases of corporate
financing, reorganization and regulation, the series presents an extreme variety of legal topics of interest to lawyers and laymen alike.
For the most part the problems discussed are practical ones and intended for the guidance of practicing lawyers in accomplishing specific
results in the best and most efficacious way. Quite a number of the
lectures deal with matters of procedure.
Comparing the present volume with those that have gone before,
the reviewer is inclined to doubt whether it measures up to the
standard set by the earlier volumes. The weakness is apparent both
in the importance of the subject matter discussed and in the eminence
of the barristers presenting the lectures. The sixteen addresses contain little that is of practical value to the average attorney. And the
list of authors does not boast any names comparable to: George W.

KENTUCKY LAW JOUR.NAL
Wickersham, Roscoe Pound, Harlan F. Stone, Elihu Root, Benjamin N.
Cardozo, Learned Hand, Sir John Salmond, Walter Wheeler Cook,
Charles S. Whitman, Samuel Williston, James M. Beck and others
whose names appear so often in the other volumes of the series.
The number of lectures precludes much comment on specific ones.
The best of the lot appears to be "The Bar's Responsibility in the Matter of Federal Taxation," by J. Gilmer Korner, Jr., Chairman of the
United States Board of Tax Appeals. The lecturer places upon the bar
the responsibility for the condition giving rise to the criticism directed at Federal revenue statutes and their administration. He charges
the bar with the neglect of this branch of the law and the leaving of
the solutions of intricate problems arising thereunder to laymen and
accountants. The lecture presents the history of the Board of Tax
Appeals and an excellefnt description of the procedure before it. Mr.
Korner asks the assistance of the bar in its work and reaches the
conclusion that the best results obtainable in the preparation and trial
of a tax case is from a harmonious combination of efforts on the part
of the professions of law and accountancy.
Probably the most practical of the group and certainly the one
which has had the most far reaching effect is the lecture on "Suggestions for Improvements in the Law of Estates," by James A. Foley,
Surrogate of the County of New York. After picturing the existing
conditions and mentioning that there had been no general revision of
statutes on that subject for thirty years, Mr. Foley pointed out certain
defects and suggested remedies therefor. In conclusion he suggested
that a legislative or executive commission be appointed to draft and
present to the legislature certain changes dealing with the law of
estates. Although some of the changes which he offered appeared
radical he pointed out that conservative England had accepted many
of them. As a result of his address agitation along that line led to the
creation of a commission of which Mr. Foley himself was made chairman. The efforts of this commission were rewarded when their recommendations took the form of an act passed by the New York Legislature in 1929 providing many and wide sweeping changes in the law of
1
estates.
There are no doubt many who would heartily disagree with the
views of Judge Knox on the doctrine of Self Incrimination and the
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure.
However his lecture adds nothing to the arguments of Wigmore and
others who have been so earnest in the denunciation of the departure
in the Boyd and Weeks cases.
One of the most interesting lectures is Mr. Loesch's delightful comment on the value of a knowledge of legal novels. In the course of his
paper the. author reviews the classic legal novels from those by Dickens
down to those by Arthur Train. A mere cursory reading of his lecture
will suffice to convince any member of the profession of the positive
and practical benefits to be derived from the time so pleasantly spent
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in reading novels in which the principles or the profession of law form
a main part of the author's theme.
Some of the lectures in the series present material on subjects
that it would be rather difficult to find treated elsewhere. Few of
them have appeared in legal periodicals. In spite of the criticism that
has been directed at the present volume, the series as a whole may well
be cbmmended. It is one that no library should be without and the
better law firms could do much worse than make room for it on their
crowded shelves.
Roy ROBERT RAY.
School of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
ADr=STTxw LAW. By Frederick J. Port. Longmans, Green &
Co. 1929. pp. xxii, 374.
JUSTic AND ADnmSTRnTivE LAw. A Study of the British Constitution. By William A. Robson. MacMillan & Co., Limited, London.
1928. pp. xviii, 346.
These two English books dealing with administrative law stress
the development of "Executive Justice" as it is sometimes called and
disclose a clear-cut break-away from that Rule of Law which the late
Professor Dicey regarded as the essential feature of the English constitutional system. Both authors point out that it is futile to attempt
to turn back the growth of administrative tribunals and administrative
law by an appeal to the traditional prejudice against bureaucracy.
In addtion to formulating the main principles of administrative law,
both books are concerned with the further questions, why have administrative tribunals arisen? Are they an improvement on the courts
of law? Do thby tend to threaten or preserve the liberty of the subJect? What are their advantages and disadvantages? Do they promote
the social welfare? Is the English system of administrative law coniparable to that eiisting on the continent, and if so, Is it a good thing?
What are the limits on future expansion of administrative tribunals?
Both books are well written and well arranged, containing a list of
,cases cited.
Dr. Robson's book contains two unusual chapters, the one dealing
with what he terms "Domestic Tribunals" in which he discusses the
growth of administrative law arising from voluntary associations and
vocational organizations; the other dealing with "The Judicial Mind."
In his introduction he makes clear that an endeavor has been made to
deal with the subject from a wider point of view than the purely legal
one. "The element which we value most highly in our judicial system
Is something which is based less on external organizations than on
mental processes." (p. xiv.) In this chapter he discusses in a suggestive manner such subjects as the technique of impartial thought, the
psychological background of the administrators, the artificial reason
of the law and the limits. of judicial discretion.
Dr. Port devotes two chapters to a study of French and American
administrative law. After a careful study of the English system he
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proposes as to English administrative tribunals the following constructive suggestions: (a) Uniform system of evidence and procedure,
with restriction on the exercise of prerogative. (b) Appeals on all
questions of law. (c) Institution of administrative court of appeal.
(d) Publicity of hearings and publication of decisions. (e) All formal
tribunals to come under the Lord Chancellor, and not under the
relevant government department. (f) Annual report by the Lord Chancellor on the whole system of administrative jurisdiction.
No student of administrative law can afford to overlook these two
English works. Supplemented by Dickinson's "Administrative Justice
and the Supremacy of Law" and Freund's "Administrative Powers
over Persons and Property," the scholar in the growing field of administrative law has at his command an admirable background upon
which he can rely in working out more specialized problems.
FonnrsT RLEmE BLACK
STUDy OF JumcIcAL ADMINTISTRATION rN 'nu STATE OF MARYLAND.
By G. Kenneth Reiblich, Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. pp.

iv, 151.
This monograph is really an application of Professor W. F.
Willoughby's Principles of Judicial Administration to the situation
existing in the State of Maryland. The application is made by a
former pupil of Professor Willoughby who gives due credit to his
teacher. However, the point of the criticism is not that Mr. Reiblich
has borrowed so heavily from his teacher; it is that he has offered so
little in addition himself.
Indeed, in places where the author has not relied on Professor
Willoughby he has resorted to other authorities, some of which are
of a decidedly secondary sort. His discussion of the Judicial Council
Movement is illustrative. After rehashing Judge Paul's well known
article on the subject, he refers the reader to an article published in
1925, should the reader desire "to bring the information to date" (page
145).
The concluding chapter does have a collection of specific recommendations which are worthwhile. Some of them, however, are so
generally stated as to furnish almost no basis for practical measures
of reform. A like criticism might be made of the survey as a whole;
it would not aid a commission substantially in the task of remedying
the situation in Maryland; it merely points out the particular matters
which need attention.
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.
UNrrED STATES SurnEmS COURT 1928-1929. Review of the Work for
the October Term, 1928. By Gregory Hankin nad Charlotte A. Hankin.
Legal Research Service, Washington, D. C. 1929. pp. xi, 321.
This book constitutes the first annual review of the work of the
Supreme Court of the United States by the Legal Research Service.
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The book is intended for laymen as well as lawyers and the authors
have eliminated cases dealing with such technical branches of the law
as procedure, admiralty, bankruptcy and patents. The cases are classified under such subject headings as Taxation, Criminal Cases, Railroad Problems, Banking Cases and Anti Trust Cases. We believe that
the work is well worth while. It gives the reader a general idea of the
important adjudications made by the Supreme Court of the United
States during the last year. It is of much more value to the layman
than to the lawyer for the reason that the report of most cases is very
short and non-technical. But even to the busy lawyer it affords -a
means of keeping abreast of the times and of knowing in a general
way what the highest court in the land is doing. The reader will not
acquire a thorough knowledge of any case from reading this book but
his interest may be aroused and he may thereby be led to the orginal
report. The introduction deals in an interesting way with the actual
working of the jurisdictional act of February 13, 1925, an act that
has done much to relieve the congestion of the Supreme Court docket.
FORREST REVnR BL.&cE
TnE L1TERARY Bi:RLE or THOmAS JErpEasoN; HS" CommoNPLAcE
BOOR Or PHmosopHs mm POETS. With an introduction by Gilbert
Obinard. Johns Hopkins Press, 1928. pp. 210.
Prof. Chinard in his introduction declares that "to know a man,
it is essential not only to see him act or hear him talk but also to have
access to that 'secret garden' where he takes refuge from the world."
The "Literary Bible" gives an insight into the literary tastes of the
most widely read American of his generation. Jefferson enjoyed "the
luxury of reading the Greek and Roman authors in all the beauties of
their originals." His favorites among the writers of classical antiquity
were Herodotus, Cicero, Euripedes, Homer, Virgil and Ovid. Of the
English writers, Lord Bolingbroke was his favorite and without doubt
exerted the strongest single influence on Jefferson's thought. Professor
Chinard, the editor of the "Literary Bible" and of "The Common
Place Book-A Repertory of Jefferson's Ideas on Government," points
out that Jefferson was influenced very little by French thought before he went to France. Of the English dramatists, Shakespeare
occupied the first place. In appreciation, Jefferson wrote: "We never
reflect whether the story we read be truth or fiction. . . . The field
of imagination is thus laid open to our use and lessons may be formed
to Illustrate and carry home to the heart every moral rule of life."
As a supplement to the various biographies that have appeared, the
"Literary Bible" throws new light on the great exponent of democracy.
It gives the modern reader a sense of satisfaction to realize that in
perusing through the "Literary Bible" he is brought face to face with
those literary gems that became part of the life and thought of Thomas
Jefferson. Professor Chinard is to be congratulated in bringing this
work to the attention of the host of modern admirers of the "Sage of
FORREST REvExn BLACo.
Monticello."
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Cuummx RESEABoH 3 LAW FOB 1rTn AcADMnC Yrn 1923-1929. By
Marion J. Harron, Baltimore, Md. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929.
pp. 218.
Here is a valuable service for those engaged in any form of legal
research. For a new sort of survey this appears to be unusually comprehensive and accurate. By its aid, anyone engaged in a particular
line of study is enabled to ascertain the names and addresses of other
persons interested in the same study. In some Instances this should
prevent needless duplication of effort and in other instances it should
lead to mutual cooperation in common tasks. Likewise, the survey
should be suggestive to those just entering the research field.
GEonon RAOLAMW. Jn.

